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Lengthen effective patent protection in industrial countries and
press developing countries to introduce patent protection. These
two tactics have become important parts of the R&D-intensive
pharmaceutical industry's strategy to regain losses in market
share associated with more stringent drug safety regulations and
increased competition from generic drug companies.
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For legal and economic reasons, patents allow  Nogues indicates that the R&D-intensive
drug-inventive companies to appropriate the  pharmaceutical industry is one of few for which
returns from their innovations. Patents sustain  patents are a major instrument for protecting the
high monopoly prices that provide rents to  returns from innovations. In this industry,
undertake further R&D and allow the invention  investment in R&D is comparatively high, and
of new drugs.  drugs are easily copied.  Under these circum-
stances, the legal protection of patents is of
Much of the developing world - with very  crucial importance in determining the market
poor innovative capabilities - provide weak or  performnance  of the R&D-intensive pharmaceuti-
no patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs.  cal industry.
Moreover, some countries have not signed
international patent agreements, and they provide  Stringent regulations introduced in the 1960s
no enforcement or dispute settlement mecha-  -to  protect consumers from risky drugs -
nisms. To confront this situation, industrial  increased the costs of R&D in the U.S. pharma-
countries have resorted to bilateral and multilat-  ceutical industry and reduced effective patent life
eral pressures. For example, industrial country  (because the time needed on testing for comply-
negotiators at the Uruguay Round (especially  ing with drug safety regulations has increased
Japan, the EC, and the United States) have  quite significantly'.  This reduces the profits per
proposed that patents be offered in all fields  dollar invested in R&D.  Also during the 1980s,
(including pharmaceuticals), that they last 20  several institutional changes seeking to reduce
years from date of application, that compulsory  medical costs facilitated competition from
licenses be applied only in extraordinary circum-  generic drugs and squeezed the sales of the
stances, and that a strong dispute settlement  R&D-intensive industry. Finally, the potential
mechanism be established.  By historical stan-  market for patented drugs in developing coun-
dards, these homogeneous proposals are unique.  tries is no longer trivial.
In general, developing countries have opposed
these reforms.  Some of them, su'ch as Brazil and  So this powerful industry is lobbying
India, have done so explicitly.  strongly for longer patent protection domesti-
cally and stronger protection in developing
countries.
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I.  Introduction
On September  1989--the  deadline for  a  U.S. investigation  --Argentina
announced that within two years it would submit a draft law extending patent
pzotection to pharmaceutical products.  One year earlier--on October 20, 1988-
-the  U.S. Federal Register published the list of goods on which the U.S. would
retaliate  by increasing  ad-valorem tariffs rates to 100 percent on imports  from
Brazil;  this  country  had  refused  to  negotiate  patent  protection  to
pharmaceutical drugs.  On December 18, 1987, the EC removed Korea from the list
of  countries  eligible for  GSP treatment. The  reason:  Korea  had refused to  grant
EC manufacturers the same intellectual property protection it affords to U.S.
exporters.  The EC,  Japan ar.d  the  U.S. have all tabled  proposals at the  Uruguay
Round  for  significantly  greater  homogeneity  and  higher  protection  of Intellectual
Property  Rights (IPRs)--patent  protection to  pharmaceuticals probably  being the
most  significant item in this agenda--around the world.  The proposals are
directed at developing countr5es,  which--so far--have resisted
This  list--which goes on--of bilateral and multilateral actions
raises a  question:  why all  these pressures on developing countries?  The
I appreciate comments received from Bela Balassa and Paul Meo.  I
also appreciate efficient typing from  Maria Teresa Sanchez.
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hypothesis of this paper is that part of these pressures evolve as a reaction
to  institutional  and  competitive  changes  that  have  taken  place  in  the
pharmaceutical drug markets of industrial  countries.  Most importantly, these
changes refer to tighter drug safety and efficacy regulations and to increased
competition  from  generic  drugs. At the  same  time,  besides patents  other  policies
of developing countries --  such as trade barriers, price controls and, (most
importantly)  the  administration  of  regulations--also  have  an  impact  on
competitive positions of different firmis. Nevertheless, this paper focuses on
developments taking place in industrial  countries.
The plan of the paper is as follows:  Section II will review the
worldwide  pattern of  patent policies  and  the  pressures from industrial  countries
on  developing  countries  for  modification  of  patent  laws  in  general,  and
pharmaceutical drugs in particular.  Section III presents the evidence on the
relative importance of patents  for the pharmaceutical industry.  Section IV
discusses  changes  in  effective  patent  duration  as  modified by  regulatory
policies.  Section  V presents evidence on the growing importance  of competition
between  brand  names  and  the  generic drug  industry and  the  impact of  this
competition on drug prices.  Section VI presents some final remarks.
II.  Pressures on DeveloRing Countries
The purpose of this section is to highlight the pressures put by
industrial countries for reforming  patent policies in LDCs.  It first presents
the worldwide pattern of patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs and the
proposals  for  reform of  patent policies  tabled at  the  multilateral  trade
negotiations of the Uruguay Round.  Subsection 1 will also argue that for the
first time in modern economic history, industrial countries have come to an3
agreement  on  "appropriate"  patent  protection.  Subsection  2  will  provide  a  brief
discussion  of  some  of  the  bilateral  actions  taken  by  industrial  countries  against
developing  countries; the  existing  patent  policies  of  many of these  countries
are  quite  apart  from  the  proposals  of  industrial  countries.  Finally,  subsection
3  will  provide  a  brief  discussion  of the  economic  interests  at stake.
1.  Patent  protection  to  pharmaceuticals
While  today  a  great  majority  of induLtrial  countries  provide  pater.t
protection  for  pharmaceutical  drugs,  there  are  many developing  countries  that
do not.  Nevertheless,  it should  not  be corcluded  that  patent  protection  for
pharmaceuticals  has  a  long  tradition  in  industrial  countries.  For  example,  only
in 1949  did  the  United  Kingdom  introduce  patent  protection  for  pharmaceutical
drugs.  Also, many other  industrial  countries  have only recently  introduced
patents  for  pharmaceuticals,  including  Germany,  1968;  France,  1960;  Italy,
1978;  Japan, 1976;  Sweden, 1978;  and Switzerland,  1977.  Thus, among
industrial  countries,  for  many  years  the  pharmaceutical  industry  was  one  at
few  that  remained  unprotected  by patents. Even  today  some  industrial  countries
such  as  Australia,  Finland,  New  Zealand  and  Norway,  still  refuse  to  grant  patent
protection  to pharmaceuticals; Spain  will introduce  it only in 1992 (Lobo,
1988).
Furthermore,  at different  times, industrial  countries  enforce  a
system  of  patent  licenses  that  restricts  the  monopoly  of the  patent  owner  quite
significantly.  This  is  the  case,  for  example,  in  Canada  and  the  United  Kingdom.
Other  countries-  -including  the  U.S.  -- have  used  antitr.ast  legislation  to  control
license  agreements.  For  example,  when  discussing  the  patent  system  in  general,
Scherer  asserts  that  "..  .compulsory  licensing  has  been  specified  as  a  remedy  in4
more than 300 antitrust cases, making available some 40,000 to 50,000 patents
at 'reasonable' royalties or (in a few instances) royalty free ... "  (Scherer,
1980, p. 397).
On the  other  hand, many  developing  countries  have not  yet introduced
patent protection for  pharmaceuticals.  As a matter of fact, the  pharmaceutical
industry is the one most often excluded from patent protection in developing
countries. 2 Tha3  World  Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO, 1988), has
listed 49  countries as  not  providing patent  protection  for pharmaceutical
products: 3 Argentina, Australia*, Bolivia, Brazil*, Bulgaria, Chad, China,
Colombia*, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Germany Democratic
Republic, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Korea, Lebanon,
Libya, Malawi*,  Mexico*,  Monaco,  Mongolia, Morocco,  New  Zealar'.*,  Norway,
Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Soviet Union, Spain (until 1992),
Syria, Thailand,  Tunisia,  Turkey, Uruguay,  Venezuela, Vietnam,  Yugoslavia,
Zambia* and Zimbabwe*.
As seen from the above list, there are many countries that provide
patent  protection for  pharmaceutical  processes,  but  not  pharmaceutical  products.
A process patent protects the product only if it is produced with it.  Since
small modifications of  a  formula create many ways  of producing  a chemical
compound, process patents are generally  viewed as providing  weak protection for
2  Other  products  and/or  processes that  are  quite  often  excluded from  patent
protection are animal  varieties, methods for treatment  of human or animal  body,
plant varieties, biological processes for  producing animal or plant varieties,
food products and computer programs (WIPO, 1989).
3  An asterisk indicates  that  patents for  pharmaceutical  processes ar_  also
excluded.5
pharmaceutical drug companies.  Furthermore,  in developing countries the  courts
have often interpreted the exclusion of pharmaceutical product patents as a
policy for  enhancing  competition  in the  drug  market.  Thus,  when cases  of  process
patents have been brought to trial, the courts  have usually turned  down demands
to use these patents to  protect the  monopoly power of the product.
Thus, a significant part of the developing world, provides weak
patent protection for  pharmaceutical  drugs; very often  patent protection is  not
provided or, if provided, it is not legally strong.  This situation has become
an  issue  for  multilateral  negotiations  between  developed  and  developing
countries.  Also, the lack of patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs has
triggered  numerous  bilateral  actions  of  industrial  against developing  countries.
According to  Benko (1988),  these  complaints refer  to the  characteristics  of  both
the international  and domeg ic  patent regimes.  Industrial  countries argue that
the international  patent regime  is inadequate  because a number  of countries  have
not signed some of the interi,ational  agreements and also because they provide
no  enforcement  or  dispute  settltt._nt  mechanisms.  Furthermore,  industrial
countries  complain  thac domestic  patent regimes  of  many developing  countries  are
inadequate  because patent protection:  is too short;  some industries such as
pharmaceuticals are excluded;  the legal enforcement of patent rights is weak;
and too much emphasis is given to compulsory licensing.
At  the Uruguo?y  Round, industrial country negotiators  --including
those of the EC, Japan and the US  - - have proposed among other things that
patents should  be offered  in  all fields;  that  they should  last for  20  years from
date  of  application;  that  compulsory  licenses  should  b-  applied  only  in
extraordinary  circumstances  and that  there  should  be a strong  dispute  settlement
mechanism.  The  few  developing  countries  that  have  tabled  proposals  on6
intellectual property rights --  for example Brazil anid  India --  oppose these
reforms. The  only  exception  is  Korea,  which  has  tabled  a  proposal  very  similar
to that  of industrial  countries.
Thus,  we might conclude  that from an historical  perspective  the
current  situation  finds  industrial  countries  in quite  general  agreement  on a
policy  issue  --  patent  protecti.n  in general  and for  pharmaceutical  drugs  in
particular  --  where  until  not  long  ago  important  differences  w'  re  observed  among
them. Explaining  this  is  not  easy,  but  at  the  very  least  we  can  '-ey  that  neither
theory  nor  empirical  research  provide  support  for  the  current  state  of  affairs.
There  is  no theory  of  patents  powerful  enough  to  provide  those  in favor  of the
above  mentioned  patent  policies  with  strong  support  (Braga,  Evens"-.  and  Lesser,
1990). The  most  general  economic  model  of patents  is  that  of  Nordhaus  (1969);
in this  model  iL  is  only  under  a very  particular  set  of parameter  values  that
the industrial  countries'  proposals  can  be defended. 4
On the  other  hand,  empirical  research  has  shown  that  social  returns
to R&D are quite  high and generally  higher  than private  returns  (Mansfield,
1977); this  evidence  is  used  to support  patent. Furthermore,  the  evidence  is
only for  industrial  countries; research  on the  social  rate  of return  of drug
innovation  in  developing  countries  has  not  been  undertaken  and  the  reason  appears
to  be simply  that  these  countries  do  not  undertake  drug  research.
4  This  particular  set  of  parameter  values  includes  the  productivity  of
R&D  which  is  expected  to  differ  quite  significantly  among  industries
and  countries.7
2.  Bilateral  policies  and  actions
In  March  of  1987,  only  a  few  months  after  the  Uruguay  Round  had  been
launched,  Mr. Gerald  J. Mossinghoff,  President  of the U.S. Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers  Association  (Pi.)  declared  that  they  were  working  with the  U.S.
Congress  to get it to enact "...the  intellectual  property  revisions  of the
Omnibus  Trade  bill that  would strengthen  the  hand of the  U.S. Government  in
urging  all of our trading  partners  to respect  our rights  in inventions  and
trademarks..."  (PMA,  1987,  underlined  by the  author). Shortly  after,  the  U.S.
Omnibus  Trade  Act  of 1988  was passed,  modifying  the  administrative  provisions
of bilateral crade instruments.  The most  significant  changes for  the
pharmaceutical  industry  were  introduced  to  Section  301  of the  Trade  Act  of 1974
(henceforth  Section  301).  This Section  provides  for the  enforcement  of U.S.
rights  under  international  trade  agreements  and  for  the  relief  from  "...  unfair
practices  of foreign  governments  which can be unjustifiable,  unreasonable,
discrimirating  or which  burden  or restrict  U.S. commerce."
If in  a Section  301 investigation  the  foreign  country  is found  to
be "violating"  U.S. rights  and it does  not correct  its policies,  the United
States  Trade  Representative  (TJSTR)  -- in  charge  of the  301 investigations--  can
recommend  the  usc.  of retaliatory  measures. The Omnibus  Trade  Act introduced
important  changes  to Section  301;  changes  which,  according  to Grinols  (1988),
would  make it easier  for  the  U.S. to expand  the  number  of 301  cases,  increase
the  likelihood  of  finding  the  investigated  country  was  acting  unfairly,  and  most
likely  increase  the  magnitude  and  duration  of the  retaliatory  measures.
Also, among  the  changes  introduced,  is a mandate  for the  USTR to
identify  priority  countries  that deny adequate  and effective  protection  of
intellectual  property  rights; currently  India  is on this  USTR list. The  U.S.8
has  threatened  to  use  Section  301  in  more  cases  than  those  actually  investigated.
For  example,  under  strong  pressures,  Korea  passed  legislation  in  1986  that  would
allow  patent  protection  for  pharmaceutical  products  (Gadbaw,  1988). However,
the attack  on Korea's  patent  policies  did not come only from the U.S.  In
December  1987,  the  EC removed  Korea from  the GSP because  it did not provide
adequate  patent  protection  for  the  R&D  intens.vA  pharmaceutical  industry  (WIPR,
1988).
Unde.  similar  pressures,  other  countries  have announced  that  they
will  introduce  patent  protection  for  pharmaceutical  products;  e.g.,  Mexico  (Gwyn,
1988)  and  Argentina  (Nogu6s,  1990).  But retaliatory  threats  have not always
ended with positive  changes by developing  countrias.  Probably,  the most
notorious  case  has  been  the  retaliatory  action  against  Brazil  undertaken  after
completion  of a 301 investigation.  Among  other  things,  this investigation  --
initiated  by the  PMA --  estimated  the  injury  to  U.S. firms  because  of absence
of  patent  protection  for  pharmaceutical  processes  and  products. Because  Brazil
did  not satisfy  the  demands  by the PMA,  the  U.S. increased  ad valorem  tariff
rates  to  100%  on  an important  number  of  goods  imported  from  Brazil  (U.S.  Federal
Register,  October  24,  1988).5
It is quite  clear from all this that developing  countries  have
confronted,  and continue  to confront,  significant  pressures  from industrial
countries  in order  for  t'em  to introduce  patent  protection  for  pharmaceutical
5  Brazil  used  to  be in  the  USTR  watch  list,  but  was  deleted  in 1990  for
having  made progress  in a number  of issues;  trade liberalization
policies  were  an  important  factor.  On  July  2,  1990  this  progress  also
led  the  U.S.  to lift  the  retaliatory  tariff  of the  301  pharmaceutical
case. Finally  it  should  be said  that  Brazil  challenged  thic  U.S.  301
action  in a  GATT  dispute  settlement  panel.9
products. The choices  for developing  countries  have narrowed;  either  they
increrse  protection  to intellectural  property  arnd  in particular  extend  patent
protection  to pharmaceutical  drugs,  or otherwise  suffer  actual  or threatened
retaliatory  actions  by industrial  countries.
3.  The  economic  interests  at stake: a  preliminary  discussion
What  would  the  pharmaceutical  companies  of  industrial  countries  gain
frorm  the introduction  of patent protection  in developing  countries?  How
important  are  these  gains? The  first  question  is  easy  to  answer,  but  the  second
has only recently  begun to be analyzed. Essentially,  introduction  of patent
protection  would  put an end to the era of copying  brand  name pharmaceutical
drugs  by domestic  companif3  of developing  countries. After  patent  protection
is introduced,  only brand name companies  will be the "legal"  suppliers  of
patented drugs.
Regarding  the  importance  of the  pharmaceutical  drug  market  and the
loss to copiers,  the PMA has made estimates  of some countries,  these are
presented  in  Table  1. Part  of  the  pharmaceutical  drug  market  in  these  countries
is supplied  by patent  owners,  but part is also sdpplied  by copiers;  the
proportion  supplied  by  these  latter  type  of  firms  varies  betwecn  countries,  being
highest  in  India  (36.1%)  and  lowest  in  Brazil  (5.5%).6  Overall,  in  these  four
countries,  the PMA  estimates  that  the sale  of copied  drugs  amounts  to  US$1.4
billion  per  year. The  speed  at  which  domestic  copiers  would  loose  their  market
to  patent  owners  depends  in  part  on  whether  patent  protection  would  be enforced
6  These  proportions  have  varied  quite  drastically  over  time  as  economic
conditions  and  regulatory  behavior  have  come  to  benefit  multinational
companies  or  domestic  companies.  See  for  example  Katz  and  Groisman
(1988)  for  the  case  of  Argentina.10
retroActively.  In the absence of retroactive enforcement, the rate of market
loss  of copiers  will depend in  part on the rate of introduction  of new patented
drugs.
Table 1:  ESTIMATES OF INCREASED INCOME  OF PHARMACEUTICAL
COMPANIES HOLDING PATENTS (US$  M)
Countries
Vdriables  Argentina  Brazil  India  Mexico  Total
1. Pharmaceutical market
size  1,200.0  2,000.0  4,200.0  1,000.0  8,400.0
2. Patented pharmaceutical
market  771.0  1,750.4  2,546.0  852.5  5,919.9
2.1  Sales by domestic
firms of copied
drugs  231.S  93.8  920.0  136.5  1,381.3
2.2  Sales of drugs by
firms who are patent
owners  540.0  1,656.6  1,626.0  716.0  4,538.6
3. Percentage share of U.S.
companies a/  45.0  50.0  45.0  50.0  n.a.
a/  Refers  to  share  of  sales  of  U.S.  companies  in  total  sales  by
multinationals.
Source:  Mac Laughlin, et. al. (1988).
The US$1.4 billion is a fraction of the worldwide sales of R&D
intensive pharmaceutical  companies;  it  is  likely  that  this  fraction has
increased.  This is certainly one of the reasons wny the pharmaceutical drug11
companies  are  pressuring  developing  countries. But the  cential  hypothesis  of
this paper is that these  pressures  are also triggered  by changes  which  have
occurred  in  industrial  countries.  The  R&D  intensive  industry  seeks  to  maintain
and  regain  the  market  share  that  has  been  increasingly  lost  to  the  generic  drug
industry. A major component  for achieving  this goal is to increase  patent
protection.
III. The Importance  of Patents  to the  Pharmaceutical  Drug  Industry
This  section  makes  three  points. First,  patents  are  inportant,  but
only  to a few  industries,  one  of  which  is  pharmaceutical  drugs  (Subsection  1).
Second,  the importance  of patent  protection  for this  industry  comes  from the
strength  that they  provide  in litigations  (Subsection  2).  Finally,  although
patent  protection  is  important  to  only  a  few  industries,  the  pharmaceutical  drug
industry  happens  to be among  the  most  R&D intensive  and as a matter  of fact,
invests  an important  proportion  of aggregate  R&D.
1.  The  inter-industry  importance  of  Datents
There is a  general presumption  that patents are an important
instrument  for  allowing  inventors  to appropriate  the  returns  from  inventions.
In evidence  accumulating  in  *recent  years shows that patents are far more
important  for some inventions  and industries  than for others.  Probably  the
pioneering  study  to  throw  light  on  this  issue  was  undertaken  by  Mansfield  (1986).
His  figures  are  reproduced  in  Table  2;  they  show  by industry  and  for  the  early
80's,  the  percent  of inventions  that  would  not  be developed  nor  introduced  into
the  market  in the absence  of patent  protection. According  to these  figures,
far  more  of the  innovations  produced  by the  pharmaceutical  drug  industry  would12
not  had  been  developed  or introduced  in  the  absence  of  patent  protection.
Mansfield's conclusions received  important support  from  a
comprehensive  study  undertaken  by Levin,  et.  al (1987). This  study  examined
Table  2 :  PERCENT  OF INVENTIONS  THAT  WOULD  NOT
HAVE  BEEN  DEVELOPED  OR INTRODUCED  IN  THE
ABSENCE  OF PATENT  PROTECTION  a/
Percent  that  would  Percent  that  would
not  have  been  not  have  been
introduced  developed
Pharmaceuticals  65  60
Chemicals  30  38
Petroleum  18  25
Machinery  15  17
Fabricated  Metal  Products  12  12
Primary  metals  8  1
Electrical  equipment  4  11
Instruments  1  1
Office  equipment  0  0
Motor  vehicles  0  0
Rubber  0  0
Textiles  0  0
a=/  Some  inventions  that  were  developed  in  this  time  period  (1981-83)  were  not
introduced  then,  and  some inventions  that  were introduced  then  were not
developed  then. Thus,  the  left-hand  column  of  the  table  refers  to  somewhat
different  inventions  than  does  the  right-hand  column.
Source  :  Mansfield  (1986)
the  relative  importance  of different  ways  of  protecting  the  inventor's  returns
on his inventions. The authors  prepared  a comprehensive  questionnaire  and
interviewed  research  managers  from  130  U.S. industries.  One set  of questions
included  the  views  of these  managers  regarding  the importance  of alternative
means  of  appropriating  the  returns  from  the  innovations  made  by  their  enterprises
--  patents to prevent duplication,  patents to secure  royalties,  industrial13
secrets, lead time, learning advantages and sales and/or service efforts.  The
authors distinguished between process and product innovations and the answers
were rated on a one to sever.  scale.  The study showed that on average the most
important  means of appropriating the returns in  process and product innovations
are lead time  and sales/service  efforts;  in  contrast,  patents to secure  royalty
income in  process and product innovations  were only 65% and 67% as important as
lead time and sales-service efforts respectively.
Table 3  from  Levin,  et.  al. (1987)  answers  a  similar  question to  that
raised in Mansfield (1986),  namely what is the inter-industry importance of
Table 3: EFFECTIVENESS  OF PROCESS AND PRODUCT PATENTS
AS A MEANS OF PROTECTING THE  RETURNS
FROM INDUSTRIAL  INNOVATION
Industry  Process  Patents  Product  Patents
Pulp, Paper and Paperboard  2.6  3.3
Cosmetics  2.9  4.1
Inorganic chemicals  4.6  5.2
Organic chemicals  4.1  6.1
Drugs  4.9  6.5
Plastic materials  4.6  5.4
Plastic products  3.2  4.9
Petroleum refining  4.9  4.3
Steel mill Products  3.5  5.1
Pumps and pumping equipment  3.2  4.4
Motors, generators and
controls  2.7  3.5
Computers  3.3  3.4
Communications equipment  3.1  3.6
Semiconductors  3.2  4.5
Motor vehicle parts  3.7  4.5
Aircraft and parts  3.1  3.8
Measuring devices  3.6  3.9
Medical instruments  3.2  4.7
Full sample  3.5  4.3
Source:  Levin, et. al., (1987).14
patents for appropriating the returns from innovation.  Again the answers are
rated on a one to seven scale.  The figures in this table show that patents are
most  important to protect  the process and product  innovations of  the drug
industry; these patents were rated 40% and 51%  higher than the industrial
industrial  averages for  processes and products respectively.  Furthermore, "...
only five  of 130 industries rated  product patents to prevent duplication higher
than six (out  of seven)  points ... "  (Levin,  et.  al. ,  1987,  p. 795).  Drugs  were
one of the five.
The importance  of patents  for the  pharmaceutical  drug industry is  not
restricted to the U.S.  For example, in a classic study of the British patent
system,  Taylor  and Silberston  assert  that  the  "....  pharmaceutical industry  stands
alone in the extent of its involvement  with the  patent system ...  n  (Taylor  and
Silberston, 1973, p. 231).  Clearly then, in industrial countries patents are
a crucial  policy instrument in determining  the returns to innovative  efforts in
a core group of industries and particularly for  pharmaceutical drugs.
2.  The inter-industry  strength of legal  protection
There are several hypotheses as to why the importance of patents
differs so markedly between industries.  For example, in some industries such
as consumer electronics the rate of innovation and product differentiation is
so fast that lead times are the most natural way of appropriating the returns
from innovation.  On the other hand, many innovations  may not be patentable in
the sense  of  satisfying the  requirements for a  patent;  namely,  that  the
invention is novel, that it has utility and that it is non-obvious.  But even
if an invention were patentable, it could be that because a patent discloses15
valuable information,  the  owner would  prefer to  keep it as a secret.  This could
be particularly important when the inventor fears that the courts will not
protect his patent rights.
Precisely  this legal  aspect is  an important  factor  that  explains  the
importance of patents to the pharmaceutical industry;  to quote, the "...  most
probable explanation for  the robust finding that patents are  particularly
effective in chemical industries is that comparatively clear standards can be
applied  to  assess  a  chemical  patent's  validity  and  to  defend  against
infringement. The uniqueness  of a specific  molecule is  more easily demonstrated
than the novelty of, for example, a new component of a complex electrical or
mechanical system.  Similarly, it is easy to determine whether an allegedly
infringing  molecule is  physically identical  to a patented molecule;  it is more
difficult to determine whether comparable component of two complex systems do
the same work in substantially the same way." (Levin, et. al., p. 798).  This
quote could also be extended to pharmaceutical  drugs for  which as said, patents
are the most important  means of appropriating the returns from R&D.
3.  The relative importance of R&D invested  by the  private
pharmaceutical industry
The amount of R&D undertaken by  the private pharmaceutical drug
industry is  very high.  First, firms  in this industry  typically invest  a  minimum
of around 10% of their sales in R&D.  But in  some countries like the U.S., this
proportion increased  during the 1980s  and--according to the PMA--reached 16% in
1988.  This  contrasts  with  the  economy-wide average  R&D  investment  as  a
proportion of GDP of industrial countries  which stands at around 2.5% (Evenson,
1990).  This  puts  the pharmaceutical  firms among  the  most  intensive  R&D16
industries  of industrial  countries. Second,  these  firms  are generally  huge;
in 1982  each  of the  thirty  largest  pharmaceutical  drug  companies  of the  world
had  sales  above  US$1  billion. Third,  in  absolute  terms,  the  total  amount  of  R&D
invested  by pharmaceutical  firms in industrial  countries  is enormous.  For
example,  accordL..g  to PMA reports,  investment  in R&D of the private U.S.
pharmaceutical  firms  exceeds  US$7  billion; the  industry  is  proud  to  remind  the
general  public  that  this  is  higher  than  the  total  investment  undertaken  by the
U.S.  National  Institute  of  Health  for  biomedical  research  (emphasized  by the  PMA
in the Washington  Post, November  17, 1989, p. A60).  Such a  figure  also
represents  close  to  10%  of  all  U.S.  R&D investment  . 7
Summing  up,  in  only  a few  industries  do  patents  appear  to  be a  major
instrument  for  fostering  technological  innovation  and  diffusion; in the  great
majority,  innovation  appears  to  be triggered  by market  conditions.  One  of the
few  industries  where  patents  are  a  major  instrument  for  protecting  intellectual
property  is  pharmaceutical  drugs. Although  these  drugs  are  easily  copied--with
or  without  the information  disclosed  in  the  patent  (Mansfield,  1985)--they  are
unique innovations  and therefore,  the legal protection  provided  by patent
litigation  is  clearly  in  favor  of innovating  firms. Finally,  although  for  many
industries  patents  are generally  unimportant  as a means  of appropriating  the
returns from R&D,  give& the size of R&D  invested  by  the private U.S.
pharmaceutical  drug  companies, one  may  conclude  that  patents  are  an important
instrument  in  protecting  a  non-negligible  portion  of  the  output  of total  R&D  of
industrial  countries.
7  Among  the  30  largest  pharmaceutical  companies,  14  are  from  the  U.S.,
12 are  European  and  four  from  Japan  (The  Financial  Times,  4/11/89,
p. 23).17
IV.  Safety Regulations.  Productivity  of  R&D  and  Effective Patent
Duration: The  Case  of the  U.S. 8
This section  makes  essentially  two points.  First,  there  are two
approaches  to deal  with  the  fact that  pharmaceutical  drugs  can  be a source  of
serious  health risks;  these approaches  can be biased towards the market
mechanism  or towards  a  governmental  enforced  regulatory  system. The  history  of
the  U.S.  -- and  other  industrial  countries--shows  a  clear  drift  towards  the  second
approach  (Subsection  1).  Second,  the  stringent  regulations  introduced  in the
U.S.  during  the  early  1960s,  has  had  clear  effects  on  the  costs  and  productivity
of  R&D  undertaken  by  private  pharmaceutical  companies. Furthermore,  increased
safety  and  efficacy  regulations  have reduced  the  effective  patent  protection,
thus  reducing  the  profits  per  dollar  invested  in  R&D (Subsection  2).  This  has
been  an  important  argument  in  defending  this  industry's  request  for  longer  patent
duration;  it is also a factor  in explaining  the industry's  demand  for  higher
protection  in developing  countries.
1.  Market induced information  flows vs.  government safety
regulations
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  discuss  the  effects  of  the  changing
regulatory  environment  of pharmaceutical  drugs  in  the  United  States. Safety
regulations  in  the  area  of  these  drugs  are  justified  with  the  argument  of  market
failure. The  problem  is that  pharmaceutical  drugs  can  be a source  of serious
risks;  in  fact,  some  fatal  cases  associated  with their  consumption  have shaped
This  section  draws  from  Grabowski  and  Vernon  (1983).18
the  nature of regulations in  the  U.S. as  well as in  other countries.  The  problem
is essentially one of incomplete and/or inaccurate information which is more
serious in the case of new and relatively undertested drugs.  The solution, or
at least  the reduction in  health risks,  lies in improved  information  on  positive
and negative effects of drugs.
Two ways to reduce health risks can be envisaged;  market-oriented
and government-oriented. In  a  market-oriented  approach,  the  quality  and  quantity
of information on drug therapy  would rely mainly on the quality of the doctors
and the professional management of manufacturing enterprises.  Presumably, the
degree  of  market  success  of  these  agents  would  be  linked  to  their
professionalism. Furthermore,  potentially  abusive  behavior  by  these  agents  would
be  checked by other institutions; the law would define the boundaries under
which behavior by doctors and firms could remain unpunished.  The Government
could  also  reinforce the  market  by  directly  providing  or  enticing  private  parties
to improve and disclose the best information  possible.
An alternative approach would suggest that because the market is
unreliable for  these purposes, it  is preferable to introduce a  centralized
regulatory agency.  This alternative  course  of action is  likely to  be taken  when
the perceived  risks of relying on  the market remains very  high.  The U.S.
pharmaceutical drug history demonstrates this latter approach;  today the U.S.
Government shares major responsibility for negative health consequences that
could  arise  from  the marketing  of risky  drugs.  The  first law  regulating
pharmaceuticals was the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.  This law prohibited
adulteration and mislabelling of food and drugs.  The aim of the law was to
improve the quality of information,  and the role of government was essentially19
to prosecute violators and, when necessary, withdraw their products from the
market.
In 1938, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act tightened regulations of
pharmaceutical drugs.  The law was passed after several hundred children died
as  a  consequence  of  the  combination  of sulfanilamide  and the  poisonous  diethylene
glycol, which had been marketed without toxicity tests.  The new law required
firms  to submit a  new drug application (NDA)  to  the Food  and Drug  Administration
(FDA),  demonstrating that the drug  was safe.  The application  was automatically
approved in sixty  days unless the  FDA recommended  otherwise.  These regulations
remained unchanged until 1962.
In  spite of the tighter regulations between  1938 and  1962, R&D
continued  to  increase and  during  those  years  major  medical  discoveries--
particularly in the area of antibiotics--were  introduced.  In fact, in terms of
profits, the  pharmaceutical industry was one of  the best performers.  The
perfo mance  was so  visible that  in  the early 1960s,  Senator  Estes  Kefauver  begun
a series of congressional hearings with the aim of reducing the market abuses
of  pharmaceutical  drug companies  which  were claimed to  be associated  with patent
rights.  Senator Kefauver advocated the introduction of compulsory licensing.
At  the  same  time,  the  thalidomide case  occurred,  and  the nature  of  the
discussions  on the  pharmaceutical industry  shifted from one of market abuses to
one of product safety.  In 1962 the  Kefauver-Harris  Amendment to the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act of 1938 was passed.  The major provisions of the amendment
include a  requirement of  efficacy and  the establishment of FDA  regulatory
controls.  Furthermore, the provision to approve a new drug application  within
60 days was  repealed;  the FDA is now quite free to take whatever time is20
necessary for approving a drug.9
2.  Consequences of the 1962 drug safety regulations
The new regulations  have  made the  U.S. Government  switch from  a role
of legislating for improving market performance to one of regulating directly
via the FDA.  As a consequence, the duration and stringency of the tests that
the FDA requires for approving new drugs increased considerably.  The average
industrial  phase of testing  for toxicology  and effectiveness  is estimated to  be
6.4  years.  It is only after 2 to 15  volumes of material and 10 to 100 volumes
of raw data that the firm is ready to submit to the FDA an application for
approval.
In 1963, the average time it took the FDA to decide on a new drug
was fourteeni  months.  By 1979, the average time had increased to thirty five
months  and in 1986 it  was thirty  seven  months. As a consequence  of the increased
and lengthier tests,  the average  time to  develop a new  drug from  start to  market
is around 10 years--a major factor in reducing effective patent protection--
and the average cost per approved pharmaceutical drug has increased to US$125
millio-.  0 This  cost  includes those associated with  all  (successful and
unsuccessful)  new chemical entities that enter clinical testing.
The regulations  also  had severe  consequences  on tihe  productivity of
R&D.  For example, after 1962, the number of new drugs marketed in the U.S.
9  The thalidomide case had worldwide implications on the nature of
regulations for drugs.  For a discussion of the changes introduced
in the U.K.  see Hartley, et. al, (1986).  But in spite of these
changes, the U.S. regulations are believed to be among the most
stringent in the  world.
10  Estimated  by  the  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers  Association  (The
Washington Post, November 17, 1989  p. A-60).21
declined from  around 50  per year to 20 in 1986.  Some observers  have attributed
this decline to the depletion of research opportunities, but the bulk of the
evidence suggests that this  was primarily  associated  with the 1962 regulations.
This is  borne out  not only  by time series  analysis of the  U.S. but also  bv cross-
section analysis.
The consumer loss from lower drug innovations as well as the fact
that even approved drugs are introduced  with an important lrg in relation to
other countries can be substantial.  The counterpart  benefits of the new drug
regulations have  apparently been  small.  For example,  Peltzman  (1975) has
estimated that the  cost of avoiding the introduction  of ineffective drugs  could
be four times higher than the benefits that would accrue if more and faster
introduction  of drugs  were allowed.
The  question  has also  been looked  at in  an international  perspective
by  comparing  the  U.S.  with  Europe,  which  has less  stringent  regulations. Perhaps
because  of  this,  between  1964  and  1975,  Europe  discontinued  the  marketing  of five
drugs.  The benefits for the  U.S. of  not having introduced these  drugs--because
Europe  learned before  of  the  risks--has not  been  estimated, but  there  is
agreement that these benefits probably have been small."  An  indicative  and
serious case,  in  terms of health  consequences in  the  U.S.,  was  Zomax,  a
prescription painkiller.  After more than two years this product was withdrawn.
from the U.S. market in early 1983 when  reports showed that severe allergy
reactions could occur.  Later in 1985, a study  by the FDA concluded that Zomax
There  has  also  been  a  case  of  a  new  drug--Oraflex--that was
introduced into the U.S. market and later discontinued, when  in
Europe--where the drug had beer-  introduced before--it was noticed
that in some cases it  had severe side effects.22
had probably been a factor in 14 deaths and in  403 life-threatening  reactions.
This  case  led  to  numerous  litigations  against  Mc  Neil  Pharmaceutical,  a
subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, and the producer of Zomax (Washington Post,
October  25,  1988).  The conclusion  from  this  is that,  in  spite of  heavy
regulations,  health risks  continue to  exist.  There also is little  evidence  that
the  consumer  benefits in  the  U.S.  where regulations  apparently  are  much stricter,
are higher than in other countries.
Finally, it could be argued that more stringent regulations have
reduced the  number of ineffective  drugs  being introduced into  the  market.  While
this might be true, it appears that the proportion of ineffective  to total new
drugs did not decline after 1962.12
In  summary,  the  evidence  for  the  U.S.  shows  that  increased
regulations  have had a clear impact  on the  average time it  takes from the  moment
when research on a new chemical compound starts until the moment when the FDA
approves the new drug for marketing.1 3 This has reduced the effective patent
protection and today, the protection is much shorter for the pharmaceutical
industry than it is for other industries.  In addition, several institutional
changes introduced during the 1980s have facilitated  competition from generic
drugs. This,  plus the  fact that  patents  are  a  powerful instrument  for  sustaining
drug  prices, implies  that  the  rate  of  profit  per dollar  of R&D  must  have declined
12  An alternative  hypothesis--suggested to me by Jorge Katz,--is that
the increased  regulations  and testing  could have provided a further
source of learning from which the industry and the population at
large has benefitted.  To my knowledge, the importance of  this
hypothesis remains unknown.
13  There are also reports arguing that  a similar trend  has occurred in
the EC.  See for example Hartley, et. al., (1986).23
with  the  extent  of generic  drug  competition.  I  now  turn  to  a  discussion  of the
impact  of generic  drug  competition  on drug  prices.
V.  Increasing  Comnetition  from  Generic  Drugs
During  the  1980s,  there  have  been  a number  of policy  changes  which
have  facilitated  competition  from  generic  drug  companies  in  the  United  States.
Subsection  1  reviews  some  of  these  policies,  and  subsection  2  reviews  the  impact
of generic  drug  competition  on  prices.
1.  Institutional  changes  and  generic  drug  competition
Traditionally,  the  R&D intensive  pharmaceutical  firms  could  count
on  a  nunmber  of  institutions  for  lengthening  the  impact  of  patent  protection  after
their  expiration.  First,  anti-substitution  laws  meant  the  pharmacist  could  sell
to  customers  only  the  brand  prescribed  by the  physician. These  laws  in  effect
extended  the  effective  patent  life  beyond  the  legal  life.  In fact,  the  first
entrant  into  a new  drug  market  had  a privilege  that  in some  cases  extended  the
monopoly  position  well beyond  the statutory  patent  duration  (Gorecki,  1986;
Comanor, 1986;  McRae, et.al., 1985).  This situation  was facilitated  by
misinformation  or underinformation  to the  consumer,  who takes  decisions  based
fundamentally  on  what  his/her  physician  and  pharmacist  recommend  (Hall,  1986).
Such  recommendations  can  overcome  important  price  differentials  which  usually
develop  between  brand  names  and  generic  drugs.
The  1984 Patent Restoration  Act--to be discussed  below--which
facilitated  the  introduction  of  generic  drugs,  came  at  around  the  same  time  that
other  institutional  changes  were  being  introduced. First,  the  elimination  of
anti-substitution  laws  in  practically  all  U.S.  states,  permitted  the  pharmacist24
to  suggest  to  the  client  the  existence  of  a  generic  equivalent  to  the  prescribed
drug. The consumer  choice  can only be avoided  when the physician  explicitly
prescribes  that  the  patient  should  consume  a drug  from  a specific  company.
Other  U.S.  policies  which  foster  the  consumption  of  generics  are  cost
containment  policies, such as limited  reimbursement  lists.  Also, Medicaid
programs  and even private insurance  companies  are recommending  the use of
generics. All this  implies  that,  in general,  once  patent  protection  expires,
competition  from  the  generic  producing  companies  becomes  important  as soon  as
the  FDA  approves  these  drugs  for  marketing; in  fact,  as  we shall  see,  the  1984
Patent  Act reduced FDA regulations  for  generic drug approval.  To quote "...  The
experience  of two leading pharme-euticals,  Valium and Inderal,  that have
experienced  generic  competition  for  the  first  time  this  year illustrates  these
trends. These  two  drugs  have  lost  approximately  one  quarter  of  their  respective
market  shares  on  new  prescriptions  to  generic  products  selling  at  price  discounts
of 20 percent  or more.  This has occurred  within  the first  three  months  of
generic availability.  Another leading pharmaceutical,  Indocin,  has  lost
approximately  half its market share in only its second year of generic
competition. These rates  of sales'  losses  are far in excess  of historical
patterns  in  pharmaceuticals,  or  what  was experienced  only  a few  years  ago..."
(Grabowski  and  Vernon,  1986).
The  extent  of  compet£tion  from  generic  drugs  is  apparently  much  more
important  than  what  these  two  cases  show. For  example,  the  combined  U.S.  market
share  of the 13  widely  prescribed  generic  drugs  has  increased  during  the  1980s25
from  around  30X  to  60X  of  total  drug  sales.1 4 This  trend  is  expected  to  increase
as patents  on  major  sellin6  drugs  expire  in the  early  1990s.
The  R&D  intensive  pharmaceutical  firms  can  overcome  this  competition
by increasing  patent  duration  and/or  by becoming  more productive,  i.e.,  by
introducing  drugs  in the  market  at a faster  rate.  The figures  show that  the
productivity  of R&D  continues  to remain  stagnant. For  example,  according  to
reports  by the  PMA,  between  1984--when  effective  patent  duration  was  extended-
-and  1989,  R&D  by the  U.S.  pharmaceutical  industry  increased  from  a little  less
than  US$4  billion,  to  US$7.3  billion. In  spite  of this,  for  years  the  trend  in
the  annual number of new  drugs approved by  the  FDA, has  not  changed
significantly. 15 In  part,  this  should  be attributed  to  the  lag  between  initial
research  and  final  FDA  approval.  If  the  productivity  of  R&D  in  the  drug  industry
continues  to remain  stable,  competition  from the generic  drug industry  will
likely  continue  to increase. For  example,  it is estimated  that  the  market  of
major  drugs  whose  patents  will  expire  during  the  1990s  is  around  US$10  billion
and  an important  part  of this  market  will  be lost  to  generic  drugs.16
14  The Wall Street  Journal,  "Generic  Drug Scandal  Creates  Opening,"
September  6, 1989.
15  For  example,  during  the  consecutive  years  between  1980  and  1989,  the
number  of  new  drugs  approved  by the  FDA  was  12,  27,  28,  14,  22,  30,
20,  21,  20 and  23.
16  The  patents  of  the  following  major  drugs  will  expire  in  the  indicated
year:  Seldane  (Dow  Chemical,  1992);  Tagamet  (Smith  Kline,  1994);
Zantac (Glaxo/Sandoz,  1994);  Pepcid  (Merck,  Johnson  and Johnson,
2000);  Naprosyn  (Syntex/Procter  & Gamble,  1993);  Feldene  (Pfizer,
1992);  and  Nicorette  (Dow  Chemical,  1992).  (The  Wall  Street  Journal,
June 5, 1989,  p. Bl).26
2.  The Impact of Generic Competition on Drug Prices
Disentangling  the  role  of patents  on  drug  prices is  a  difficult  task,
particularly when  other  regulations--including price  controls--are  imposed.
Furthermore, although  patents provide a monopoly, prices will also reflect the
extent  of  competition  among  different patented  drugs  in  given  therapeutic
classes.  In spite of the difficulties of analyzing the impact of patents on
drug prices, two patterns tend to appear quite neatly.  First, generic drug
prices are  well below  brand name prices;  also, an important  share  of the  market
is  taken  by  generic  drugs.  Second,  the  price  of  drugs  appears  to  be
systematically lower in countries that do not provide patent protection for
pharmaceuticals.
2.1.  The impact  of generics on drug prices
It  has often  been  noticed that  generic  drugs  enter  the  market at  high
discounts  vis a vis the  brand names.  The extent of such price differentials is
best studied in  markets  with free  prices.  In this regard,  the  U.S. is generally
believed to have one of the freest pharmaceutical drug market in the world.  17
For example, Scherer (1980,  p. 390) reports that for  many years Pfizer sold the
antibiotic Tetracycline at  US$30.60 per 100 capsules.  When Pfizer's  patent was
challenged, competing firms sold the generic product at US$2.50 per bottle.
Furthermore, Scherer  asserts  that  many  " .. similar cases  of  price cost-margins
in the order of 90% for  patented drug products  have been identified..."
17  This does not mean that free pricing is always allowed.  See, for
example, a discussion of the debate on this issue published in The
Washington Post of June 11, 1989 (p.  Hl) and the recent control on
the  AIDS drug  AZT, by which the government brought down the annual
cost of treatment from US$8,000 to US$6,000.27
Other examples illustrate the impact of generic drug introduction.
One hundred tablets of 2 mg. pills of Valium are wholesale priced at around
US$30.- while the generic  Diazepan sells  for around  US$15.-  One hundred tablets
of 600 mg pills of Motrin  are wholesale priced at around US$25.- while the
generic Ibuprofen is priced at around US$14.  - Another example made by  the
President of the American Association of Retired Persons, asserts that its
members pay US$15.95 for a 3 months supply of Bolar's version of Dyazide and
US$31.95 for the Smith  Kline brand name product.  The same source asserted that
there might be a 10 to 1 difference in the price of different arthritis drugs
(The Wall Street Journal, September 6, 1989).  Similar price differences are
found  in  many other  examples  of drugs  that  have gone  off  patents such  as  Aldomet,
Amixil, Inderal, etc.18
Finally,  major  reductions  in  drug  prices  after  patent  expiration  have
also  been reported  in  other  countries.  For  example,  Taylor  and Silberston  report
that "...U.K. price reductions of the order of a quarter to a half or more have
been noted  at this  stage  of the  life-cycle  of  important  patented drugs."  (Taylor
and Silberston, 1973).
In conclusion, over time patents appear to be a major factor in
sustaining drug  prices.  Also,  the appearance of generic  competition is a
significant factor in  bringing these  prices closer to  marginal production costs
18  One might ask  what explains the  post-patent  pricing strategy of brand
name companies when they allow such significant price differentials
with their  competing  generic  drugs.  One  plausible  explanation is that
over their life brand name drugs create a clientele of relatively
wealthy doctors and  patients  who in  spite  of low  priced generic  drugs,
they  prefer to remain  loyal  to the  medicine they  have  been prescribing
and taking.28
(see also U.S. Congress,  1986);  the market  becomes  more competitive,  not
perfectly  competitive.
2.2  The  cross-country  evidence
Prices  of  pharmaceuticals  also  differ  significantly  among  countries.
Table  4  shows  a  cross-country  comparison  of  an  index  of  1975  prices  of  identical
Table  4 :  CROSS-COUNTRY  PRICES  INDEX
OF PHARMACEUTICALS  - 1975
Price  Index  Price  Index
Country  Pharmaceuticals  Country  Pharmaceuticals
Malawi  60.83+  Ireland+  73.58+
Kenya  50.63+  Hungary  57.25
India  31.71  Poland  53.98
Pakistan  38.76  Italy  69.01
Sri  Lanka  15.22+  Spain  69.68
Zambia  96.58+  United  Kingdom+  71.19+
Thailand  48.01  Japan  81.88
Philippines  51.14+  Austria  139.53
South  Korea  35.10+  Netherlands+  137.29+
Malaysia  70.74  Belgium+  101.73+
Colombia  48.07  France+  91.56+
Jamaica  46.13+  Luxembourg+  100.27+
Brazil  63.83  Denmark+  157.56+
Mexico  69.68  Germany  (F.R.)+  152.52+
Yugoslavia  48.24  United  States+  100.00+
Iran  70.42  Uruguay  65.95
+  Listed  in  Schut  and  Van  Bergeijk  (1986)  as  providing  patent  protection.
Source:  Schut  and Van Bergeijk  (1986,  Table  2).  Patent  information  for
1988  from  WIPO (1988).
packages  of pharmaceutical  products. After  fitting  a simple  econometric  model
Schut  and  Van  Bergeijk  concluded  that  a "...strong  positive  relationship  between
price level  and  per capita  GDP is found,  a lOX increase  in per capita  income29
being  associated  with  on average  8X  higher  drug  prices. The implementation  of
direct  price  control  measures  by  the  government  results  on  average  in  a  20%  price
reduction, while  government  policies such as  bulk purchasing through a
centralized  government  agency,  promotion  of the  use  of  generics  and,  to  a  lesser
extent,  excluding  patent  protection  seem  to  be  successful  in  lowering  the  general
price  level  of  pharmaceuticals."  Schut  & Van  Bergeijk,  1986  p. 1141).'g
Looking  at the  econometric  results--according  to which  the  patent
dummy variable was not statistically  significant--one  might be tempted  to
conclude  that in terms  of pharmaceutical  prices,  developing  countries  would
neither  suffer nor benefit from patent  pclicies.  But the low statistical
significance  of the  patent  dummy  variable  can  be explained  by at least  three
factors. First,  the  authors  do not distinguish  between  patent  protection  to
pharmaceutical  products  and  processes. For  example,  the  authors  listed  South
Korea  and  Zambia,  as  providing  patent  protection  to  pharmaceuticals  when  in  fact
they  only  provide  such  protection  to  processes.  More importantly,  the  authors
do  not  provide  an  idea  of  the  extent  of  regulations;  one  could  presume  that  the
price  control  dummy  variable  picks  up part of the impact  of patents,  i.e.,
dismantling  price  controls  would  result  in a relatively  higher  price  increase
of patented drugs.  Finally,  one would expect  patent protection  to have
19  The  ordinary  least  square  estimation  yielded  the  following  results:
P - 38.53  +  1.43  GDP  +  7.08  PP - 15.72  DPC - 11.12  IPC+e
(6.04)  (6.69)  N  (1.16)  (-2.30)  (-1.50)
R2 _ 0.78
where  P - price  index  of pharmaceuticals;  GDP  - gross  domestic  product;
N - population; PP  - dummy  for  patent  protection; DPC  - dummy  for  price
controls; and  IPC  - dummy  for  indirect  price  control  measures.30
particularly  strong  price  effects  in  countries  where  the  law  clearly  stands  in
favor  of  the  patent  holder. It  is  far  from  clear  whether  in  developing  countries
patent  rights  are strongly  protected  by the  law (see,  for example,  Gadbaw  and
Richards,  1988).
Probably,  the  most  we can  conclude  from  the  figures  in  Table  4 is
that in the industrial  countries  which enforced  patent protection  (United
Kingdom,  Netherlands,  Belgium,  France,  Luxembourg,  Denmark,  Germany  and the
U.S.), also showed  high prices of pharmaceutical  products.  In contrast,
developing  countries  paid  prices  for  pharmaceuticals  which  on  average  were  only
42%  of  those paid  in  industrial  countries providing patent protection.
Furthermore,  industrial  countries  like Italy  and Japan that in 1975 did not
provide  patent  protection  for  pharmaceuticals  also  showed  quite  a  high  price  of
pharmaceuticals.  This observation  lends support to  the  assertion that
pharmaceutical  companies  charge  what  the  market  will  bear.
Summing  up, the  previous  section  showed  how increasing  regulation
had  reduced  effective  patent  life. In spite  of this,  investment  in  R&D  by the
industry  has continued  to increase,  but productivity--measured  in new drug
approvals--continues  stagnant. In  this  section  we  have  argued  that  a  number  of
institutional  changes  have  facilitated  competition  from  the  generic  drug  industry
and  that  generally  such  competition  has  a  major  downward  effect  on  drug  prices.
Thus, the trend that emerges is one where profits of the R&D  intensive
pharmaceutical  industry are squeezed  by  the double effect of government
regulations  and generic  drug  competition. 20 What strategies  have the industry
followed  in  order  to confront  this  situation?
20  See  Joglekar  and  Patterson  (1986)  for  evidence  of  declining  profits
to R&D.31
VI.  Strategies  of the  R&D Intensive  Pharmaceutical  Industry
The  R&D  intensive  pharmaceutical  industry  has  followed  a  number  of
strategies  in  order  to  overcome  the  negative  impact  of the  factors  discussed  in
the  previous  section. These  strategies  can  be classified  as market-based  or
policy  determined.
1.  Market-based  competition  strategies
By market-based  competition  strategy,  I  understand  a strategy  that
is developed  and implemented  within a stable framework  of regulations  and
incentives.  In this  interpretation,  the  R&D intensive  pharmaceutical  industry
has  developed  a  number  of strategies.  First,  several  brand  name  companies  have
decided  to produce  generic  drugs  themselves.  This  has been  done  among  others
by Squibb, Warner-Lambert,  American  Cynamid and Ciba-Geigy.  It has been
estimated  that  these  companies  now supply  25%  of the  prescriptions  for  generic
versions  of  drugs  that  have  patents  expire  since  1980  (The  Wall  Street  Journal,
September  6, 1989,  p. B1).
Another  strategy  has  been to  request  the  FDA  to reclassify  some  of
their  patented  drugs  from  prescription  drugs  to over-the-counter  drugs.  This
would  familiarize  the  customer  with  the  medicine  before  patent  expiration,  thus
reducing  the  extent  of generic  competition  once  the  patent  expires.
Other  strategies  have  included  mergers.  Probably  1989  witnessed  one
of the  most  active  merger  years  in the  history  of the  pharmaceutical  industry.
The  most  visible  mergers  were  those  between  Bristol  Meyers  and  Squibb  from  the
U.S.,  with  combined  annual  sales  of  US$3.8  billion,  and  Smith  Kline  Beckman  from
the  U.S. and Beecham,  from the  U.K. (now  Smith  Kline  Beecham)  with sales  of
US$3.6  billion.  A  common  factor  underlying  this  industrial  restructuring  appears32
to be the increasing  costs of R&D. 21 It would appear  that many firms  now
consider  that  size  is  a most  important  factor  to overcome  the  barriers  imposed
by  high  R&D  costs  and  also  benefit  from  economies  of  scale  that  apparently  exist
in the  R&D  process. These  mergers  would  therefore  increase  the  probability  of
coming  up with  new  drugs  with important  market  potential. While  this  is  true,
a  declining  number  of  pharmaceutical  companies  and  increasing  concentration  might
eventually  affect  competition--among  other  things--by  reducing  the  number  of
competing  drugs  within  therapeutic  classes  (Jadlow,  et  al., 1987).22
2.  Policy-determined  strategies
In addition  to the market-based  competition  strategies  that the
pharmaceutical  industry  has  developed,  it  has  also  organized  itself  to  lobby  and
seek  for  higher  rents  thru  policy  changes.  The  industry  has  a  powerful  argument,
namely,  that the  social  rate  of return  of its  investments  in R&D is  high.  It
is  useful  to quote  Mansfield  on his  views  of rates  of return  to innovation  in
U.S.  industry  generally "...practically  all  of the  studies  carried  out  to date
indicate  that  the  average  social  rate  of  return  from  industrial  R&D  tends  to  be
very high.  Moreover,  the marginal  social  rate of return  also seems  high,
21  This is often  mentioned  in the  newspaper  articles  announcing  the
mergers.  See for example,  The Financial  Times,  August  4, 1989,
article  "In  the  Grip  of  Takeover  Fever."  Increasing  drug  competition
within  therapeutic  categories  has  also  been  a factor. For  example,
it has  been  mentioned  that  sales  of Smith  Kline's  anti-ulcer  drug
Tagamet  was losing  market  to Glaxo's  drug Zantac.  In contrast,
Beecham  has two  promising  drugs: Eminase,  for  heart  problems,  and
the  anti-arthritis  P.eliflax  (The  Wall  Street  Journal,  July  31,  1989),
which  as  part  of the  merger  agreement,  Smith  Kline  is  expecting  to
profit  from.
22  As  a  consequence  of  these  mergers,  the  proportion  of  total  sales  made
by the  four  largest  firms  increased  from  21.3%  to 24.11.33
generally  in the  neighborhood  of 30 to 50  percent. As in the  case  of studies
cited  in  the  previous  section,  there  is  a  variety  of  very  important  problems  and
limitations  inherent  in each  of these  studies. But recognizing  this  fact,  it
nonetheless  is  remarkable  that  so  many  independent  studies  based  on  so  many  types
of data  result  in  so  consistent  a set  of conclusions....  I  (Mansfield,  1989).
This conclusion  implies  that a marginal  increase  in R&D would  be
beneficial  to  society. In  order  to  have  the  incentive  to  do this,  the  industry
needs  to  appropriate  a greater  share  of the  rents  produced  by its  innovations.
This can  be done in a number  of ways but most importantly  by seeking  longer
patent  protection  at home and stronger  patent  protection  abroad.  Section  II
reviewed  the  discussion  of  patent  policies  of  developing  countries;  this  section
will  review  the  subject  in  industrial  countries.  In  addition,  the  industry  seeks
to  obtain  other  preferential  policies  such  as  subsidies  for  R&D,  additional  funds
for  the  FDA  to accelerate  the  drug  approval  process,  increasing  the  regulatory
barriers  to  market  generics  by  making  the  bioequivalency  test  between  different
brands  come  closer  to  one  another,  less  stringent  cost  containment  policies,  less
supervision  on  private  sector  pricing  policies,  lobbying  against  proposals  for
compulsory  licensing,  making  it  easier  to transform  prescription  drugs  to  over
the counter  drugs,  reduction  in the  burden  of regulations  for  drug approval,
etc. 23
As the  time  required  for  approval  of new  drugs  increased,  and the
patent  office  continued  to arrive  at a decision  much faster  than the  FDA, the
average  effective  patent  life  declined.  For  example,  Eisman  and  Wardell  (1981)
23  A presentation  of these  demands  by the U.S. industry  is made in
Pharmaceutical  Manufacturers  Association  (1987).34
have estimated an average effective patent life for new pharmaceutical drugs of
13.6  years and 9.5 years in  1966  and 1979  respectively. This appears to  be lower
than in other countries.  For example, for  a  common sample of drugs, in the  U.S.
it took from initial stage to FDA approval an average of 10.5 years, while it
averaged only 5.4 years in other countries (Mossinghoff,  1987).
As the effective patent duration declines so does the private rate
of return to R&D and the incentive to undertake this type of activities.  In
September 1984, after many years of lobbying by the industry, the Drug Price
Competition and Patent  Restoration  Act was passed as  U.S. law.  It  has two  major
components.  First, it restores part of the patent life which drugs  had lost
as the  pre-market testing  process by firms and the FDA--as  a consequence of the
1962 reforms-lengthened.  It should be mentioned that this is the first time
since 1861 chat the patent terms in the U.S. have been changed, and it changed
in favor of one  industry.  The  second major change of  the Act  is that it
facilitates the entry of generic drugs.
The extension  of patent  life  provided  by the  new law is  equal  to the
sum of the drug application review time by the FDA plus one half the clinical
testing time.  The maximum extension is of five years and no extension beyond
14  years of effective patent life  will be allowed.  For the drugs introduced in
the  U.S.  market between 1976 and 1981  the average  effective  patent life--had the
law  been applied  during  those  years--would  have increased  from  8.9  to  11.8  years,
i.e.,  by 33X.
This  is  a  significant  increase  and had  other  things  remained
unchanged, the measure would have boosted the returns to R&D.  But the other
legislative change, facilitating the introduction of generic drugs into the
market,  has apparently  compensated  the  R&D incentive  effects  of longer  effective35
patent  duration.  Under  the  new  law,  a  generic  drug  company  can  market  a  product
by demonstrating  to  the  FDA  that  the  drug  is  bioequivalent  to  the  original  one.
This  is  a low  cost  experiment  which  contrasts  with  the  lengthy  and  costly  tests
these  generic  companies  were  required  to  undertake.  Because  the  tests  undertaken
by the  original  inuovator  were  confidential,  the  FDA  required  similar  tests  by
the  generic  drug  company. But  by demonstrating  bioequivalency,  these  tests  are
not  necessary; the  new law  has thus  not only  facilitated  the introduction  of
generics  but also  eliminated  duplicative  testing.
What has  been the  impact  of the  1984  Patent  Restoration  Act?  In
terms  of the  long-run  incentives  for  R&D, the  Act  does  not appear  to have  had
a significant  effect.  Under  different  assumptions  regarding  the  extent  of  the
loss  of sales  to  generic  drugs,  Grabowski  and  Vernon  (1986)  estimated  that  the
returns  to R&D of the innovative  pharmaceutical  firms,  contingent  upon the
changes  introduced  by the new law remained  on average  quite  unchanged;  the
faster generic drug approval process approximately  counteracted  the  R&D
incentives  of  longer  effective  patent  duration.  Nevertheless,  in  the  short-run,
the  new  regulations  facilitating  the  approval  of generic  has  implied  that  these
drugs  have taken a significant  share of the market.  In the aggregate,  I
mentioned  that  the  combined  U.S.  market  share  of  the  13  widely  prescribed  generic
drugs  has  increased  during  the  1980s  from  around  30%  to  60%. More  specifically,
generic  drugs share in total  prescriptions  is now higher than 50% in the
following  therepeutic  classes: cardiovascular,  anti-diabetis,  tranquilizers,
anti-arthritis,  antibiotics  and  analgesics  (HKS,  1990). Summing  up, a global
analysis  of the  industry  concludes  that  the  short-run  impact  of the  1984  Patent
Restoration  Act  has  favored  the  generic  drug  companies  (Kaitin,  et.  al.,  1987).36
Pharmaceutical  firms  of other  countries  have  not remained  passive
to changes  in U.S. regulat.ons  and  patent  protection. For example,  for  some
time, the major EC phar-taceutical  firms have been pressing the European
Commission  for longer  patent protection.  These firms claimed that longer
effective  patent  protection  in the  U.S.  and  Japan,  as  well  as longer  gestation
periods  attributable  to  increasing  regulations,  makes  the  extension  of  effective
patent  protection  necessary.  The  European  Commission  is  now  studying  legislation
that  would  extend  such  protection  by two  years  and  legislation  providing  this
or  higher  protection  is likely  to  be approved  during  1990.
Finally,  note that the further  apart in time--from  the moment
research  on a new urug starts--a  dollar  of income  is earne%A,  the lower the
present  value.  Thus,  for the  same  amount  of time gained,  a dollar  of income
from  shortening  the length  of FDA regulations  is worth  more than  a dollar  of
income  gained  from longer  patent  protection; remember  that such  a dollar  is
earned  at the  end  of the  patent  life. Likewise,  for  any  given  drug,  one  dollar
of  earnings  from  the  introduction  of patent  protection  in  developing  countries
is  worth  more  than  one  dollar  of  earnings  from  the  extension  of  patent  protection
in industrial  countries.
Summing  up,  this  section  has  shown  that  the  R&D  intensive  industry
has  developed  a set  of  complex  strategies  in  order  to  meet  competition  from  the
generic  drug industry.  Part of this strategy  is market oriented,  but an
important  part is  also  policy  determined.  The industry  is  a highly  regulated
one,  and  each regulation  is  a source  of negotiations  between  the  industry  and
the government;  over time this dynamic interaction  between industry  and
government  knits the web and nature  of regulations. But among all of the
regulations,  patent protection  stands  high in the agenda  of the industry;37
patents  sustain  very  high  drug  prices.  In  turn,  these  profits  finance  R&D  whose
output  provide  tomorrow's  competitive  edge. Section  II  showed  the  pressures  the
industrial  countries  put  on  developing  countries  for  increasing  patent  protection
to  pharmaceutical  drugs;  this  section  shows  that  within  industrial  countries
such  protection  has already  been  granted. Nevertheless,  the  time  dimension  of
patents  suggests  that  for  similar  levels  of income,  the  introduction  of  patent
protection  in developing  countries  is  worth  more to  brand  name  companies  than
the  extension  of  patent  protection  in Industrial  countries.
VII.  FINAL  REMARKS
This paper  offers  a discussion  to the  question  of why there  are
pressures  on developing  countries  for introducing  and/or  reinforcing  patent
protection  to  pharmaceutical  drugs. The  story  is that  patent  protection  is an
important  component  of a  complex strategv  developed  by  the R&D  intensive
pharmaceutical  drug  companies  of  industrial  countries  to  meet  market  competition.
For legal and economic reasons,  patents--the  paper shows--are  fundamental
instruments  for  allowing  the  drug-inventing  companies  to  appropriate  the  returns
from  their  innovations.  Patents  sustain  high  prices, which  in turn  provides
rents  to  undertake  further  R&D,  which  in  turn  allows  the  invention  of  new  drugs,
etc.,  etc.  In recent  years,  increasing  drug regulations  have implied  that
effective  patent  protection  to the  R&D  intensive  pharmaceutical  drug  companies
has eroded.  Furthermore,  competition  from the generic  drug companies  has
increased  quite significantly.  Finally,  the potential  size of developing
countries'  markets  for  patented  drugs  is no loger  trivial.  Thus,  restoring
patent protection  in industrial  countries  and making developing  countries38
introduce  patent  protection,  has  become  part--albeit  an important  part--of  R&D
intensive  pharmaceutical  companies'  strategies  to regain  market  share.39
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